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According to Žižek, the crises of capitalism are beginning to reach apocalyptic proportions. The old ‘solutions’ of capitalism – colonization, domination of world markets, outsourcing of economic violence, exportation of poverty and so on – are becoming less and less effective. We are increasingly confronted with the excess of the excesses of capitalism. This is especially the case with the rise of international terrorism as a symptom of economic terror. Nor is this simply a matter of reflexivity along the lines of the risk society thesis. Rather it draws into focus the very logic of capitalist reflexivity itself: the ways in which capitalism paradigmatically addresses and engages with its own problems. What the present conjuncture is tending to bring about is a far more direct encounter with the drive-dynamics (or Hegelian spirit) of capitalism. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way in which today’s politics connects with the international economy. The global reach of capitalism and its attendant crises (viz the over-production of credit precipitating ‘toxic debt’ on a hitherto unknown scale) means that markets require increasing levels of political intervention in order to preserve their viability. Against the regulationist notions that the economy can, and should, be submitted to direct political manipulation, what we are witnessing today is precisely the opposite: the reduction of politics to a practice of global economic sustainability. Notwithstanding the diversity of antagonisms and all the sites of resistance, it is more and more the Saint Simonian nightmare of governance limited to the administration of things (market mechanisms) that is prevailing.

What then is a properly political intervention? What type of radical politics – political intervention beyond today’s political interventions – is possible? Postmodern and postmarxist theory have tended to respond to these types of question by giving a renewed emphasis to the themes of hegemony and radical subversion: emancipation involves essentially an acceptance of the existential nature of contingency and a celebration of the infinite play of democratic demands and articulations. The logic of the political is here seen to be always in excess of any body of politics. This distinction, between politics and the political, has taken on an increasing centrality in contemporary thought and is associated chiefly with the work of Lefort. For him the term politics – conceived as a particular level of the social whole (administrative complex, the sphere of decision-making, governance, elections and so on) - needs to be distinguished from the more radical idea of the political (le politique) as the moment(s) of rupture and contestation in which the very organising principles of the social whole are drawn into question. The political is not a demarcated level but rather a dimension (if only in potential) of every form of human endeavour wherein holism is undermined, subverted and rendered undecidable/historical.

But is this distinction so clear cut? Badiou, for example, argues convincingly that what is called the political cannot be universalised or resolved philosophically in a once-and-for-all manner (Badiou, 2006). The political, in this regard, is always bound by a politics (Badiou, 2006: 16-25). Moreover Lefort’s characterisation of politics (la politique) as essentially a formal-spatial realm is arguably too simplistic. As was familiar to Hegel, the state does not exist in its own positive terms but is always accompanied by an inherent Otherness and negativity with which it seeks to engage in order to (re-)produce itself. Politics, in this sense, strives to recognise and mediate its own failures and forms of subversion. The distinction Lefort makes between politics and the political becomes consequently more blurred. There exists rather an ongoing interweaving of the two moments (of politics and the political), in characteristic fashion, within the terms of a broader configuration which we might call the historical mode of politics.

In this context, the logics of subversion are essentially ambiguous. What appears, on the surface, as contestation and challenge against a social totality may in reality become caught up in the latter and actually serve to reinforce and stabilise it: e.g. democratic subversion as an outlet for protest and good conscience but which implicitly accepts, and legitimises, the rules/grammar of political encounter. In order to reach the dimension of politics proper, the question is whether more radical forms of subversion can be developed that are capable of subverting the very logics of existing subversion. 


Totalitarian Democracy

A commonplace today is that democracy comprises a unique historical configuration which is able to contemplate its own contingency and to thereby assign a proper materialist dignity to the dimension of the political. Democracy contains the promise of a new form of engagement in which political subjects acknowledge hegemony as a basic existential and demonstrate an awareness of their historical limitations and the provisional and partial basis of their interventions. In this way hegemony and the political are presented as categories that are reaching their full maturation in the context of the logics of contemporary democracy. 

Yet for Žižek it is more or less the opposite that pertains: the ascendance of the hegemonic form of politics is one in which the materialist force of the political is itself becoming more and more displaced and domesticated. A key reference here is Hegel. In postmodern and postmarxist thought, a distinction is made typically between necessity and contingency, where hegemony and the political are viewed as allied to the latter. As Žižek points out, this distinction is, from a Hegelian perspective, considerably overdrawn (e.g. Žižek, 1999: 98-103; Žižek in Butler et al, 2000: 227; Žižek, 2006: 75-76). For Hegel the point is rather to see how necessity develops (retroactively) in the very midst of contingency; or, to put it in the opposing register, how contingency itself is always experienced as a circumscribed or ‘systematic contingency’ (see Burbidge, 2007). In other words, what is overlooked is an account of the speculative dimension of spirit: i.e. the continually unfolding historical attempts to realise a rational consistency vis-à-vis lived existence. Spirit is something that marks the supernatural and contingent character of our engagement with the world. Spirit does not refer to anything outside itself but is entirely self-positing with the sole purpose of attempting to produce and actualize its consciousness in objective terms: to disclose and reify the fundamental principles and character of our engagement with the world. 

Democracy (even radical democracy) should not be thought of as simply liberating ‘the political’ as such, but rather as something that gives rise to a specific historical spirit of the political. In the terms of Luhmann, the political becomes part of the autopoietic and ‘necessitarian’ development of the systemic whole. The liberal-capitalist-democratic imagination and its attempts to realise a world order, for example, shows how the dominant paradigm is speculatively engaging with its inherent Othering and trying to take its own dissonances and counter-forces into account. Thus the ‘contingent’ antagonisms of terrorism, civilization clashes and so on, are presented as the ongoing birth pangs in the inevitable development of a global system. It is precisely this necessity that is reflected in George Bush’s view that freedom and democracy are ‘God’s gift to humanity’ (the dispensing of which falls, of course, to America – God’s ultimate witness). 

It is against this background that we should reintroduce the notion of totality. From an Hegelian perspective, a totality functions less as a straightforward closure and more as a characteristic form of movement-processing that gives rise to a specific mode of engagement with Otherness. Totalities emerge (retroactively) precisely when their own subversions come to be naturalised and when there is implicit acceptance as to the ways in which the gaps and inconsistencies should be addressed and resolved. A totality draws its strength not so much from the positive articulation of its elements but rather from its capacity to harness and direct its own failures. In this way, subversion itself becomes drawn into a totality’s dynamic and starts to function as a (disavowed) technique in its economy of ‘necessity’. Following Hegel, the question of necessity is not so much whether it exists but rather how is it produced in concrete terms? Yet here it could be argued that Hegel’s thought reaches a certain limit. That is to say, what is overlooked is the way in which the production of necessity (world spirit) ceases to be a means to an end but becomes an end in itself: an economy of avoiding full disclosure in order to sustain the economy as such. The name which psychoanalysis gives to this economy is, of course, drive in which the pulsional energies circulate, and result from, a central void in the order of being. The (by-) product here is the elusive, and constantly recycled, jouissance. In drive what is enjoyed is the void-as-object (objet a). In other words, the object of drive – its true aim (as opposed to contingent goals: the realisation of particular ambitions etc.) – is the continuation of itself. The transcendental (Real) character of drive-jouissance renders it indifferent to all finitude, and lays at the base of the endemic human capacity for counter-rationalist activity up to, and including, self-destruction – in all drive there is the promise of a new beginning.

An important distinction is made here between the object and the object-cause of desire. This can be illustrated in the context of today’s charity-driven approach to global ethics. The object of desire is essentially the liberal model of Society (e.g. Rorty’s ‘liberal utopia’) where suffering is alleviated and individual opportunity maximized. The object-cause of desire, however, operates more at the level of an organicist conception of Civilization: i.e. the elevated, and inaccessible, sense of a Western ‘us’ that would give a global society its paradigmatic, libidinally invested, form. This fantasmatic economy is sutured at the level of gaze. A basic scheme in many charities is that of ‘adoption’ (adopt a child/orphan/granny etc.). In return for donations, regular feedback is provided from the beneficiaries – progress reports, photographs, letters… Effectively what we have is a reification of how the Other perceives ‘us’ (the donators) as elevated benefactors. The suture is effected in this way of staging the gaze of the Other in such a way that our own gaze is returned to us. As one charity puts it, ‘you get to see and feel the difference your support makes, through the eyes of your sponsored child and their regular letters and photographs’ (www. worldvision.org). Thus what is suturing is the very fantasy about the Other’s fantasy. It is here that our special stuff (a) – the x (or, extra) factor that is projected into the gaze of the Other – is found and made palpable.

So again, there exists no simple division between (interior) objectivity and (exterior) Otherness. By zooming out, as it were, what we see is a speculative totality that attempts to traverse this division and to articulate both sides as inherent (spectral) dimensions within itself. A crucial contribution of psychoanalysis has been to show how such a totality is (retroactively) given ‘foundations’ through the mechanism of suture: that is to say, a reflexive fantasy that frames the way the Other sees ‘us’ as the authentic bearer of jouissance and who is consequently motivated to possess, thwart, destroy and/or be part of the latter.


Democracy and Ideology

Traditional liberalism was committed to a rationalistic free-market orthodoxy in whose name it was prepared to undertake extreme and highly authoritarian measures (viz. colonization). With today’s postmodern liberal democracy, however, the emphasis is far more on recognising difference and Otherness. On this basis, neo-liberal organisations such as the Adam Smith and Cato institutes, among others, are wide of the mark in denouncing initiatives such as Fair-Trade, drop-the-debt, ‘eco-radicalism’ and so on, for disturbing the normal running of the free-market. The point is rather to see how these initiatives can develop in such a way that they serve as a supplement to the latter. As Paul Hawken, the inventor of ‘natural capitalism’, and a model of postmodern-progressive liberalism, puts it:
‘Ironically, organizations like Earth First!, Rainforest Action Network, and Greenpeace have now become the real capitalists. By addressing such issues as greenhouse gases, chemical contamination, and the loss of fisheries, wildlife corridors, and primary forests, they are doing more to preserve a viable business future than are all the chambers of commerce put together.’ (Hawken, 1997: 15)
	
This view is explored more fully in his latest book, Blessed Unrest (2007). The central assertion is that our age is marked by the spontaneous and ongoing development of a new movement in response to the excesses of modernity and capitalism. This movement is not centralised or hierarchical but informal and rhizomatic in character and revolves around three central themes: the environment, human rights and social justice. It is ‘nonideological’, ‘eminently pragmatic’ and comprises essentially ‘that part of humanity which has assumed the task of protecting and saving itself’ (Hawken, 2007: 18 & 141). One might, of course, respond by asking which ideology does not see itself, in some way, as involved in saving humanity? 

Yet, for Hawken, this movement is distinguished in that it has no utopian vision and ‘doesn’t attempt to disprove capitalism, globalization or religious fundamentalism’. Rather it ‘tries to make sense of what it discovers in forests, favelas, farms…’ and is ultimately a reflection of ‘humanity’s immune response to toxins like political corruption, economic disease, and ecological degradations’ (Hawken, 2007: 141-142). The resistance-threat of the movement is directed more towards practices than principles as such:
‘The stereotype of civil society is groups resisting corporations, and that is true as outlined in previous chapters. What is also true, however, is that nonprofit groups have formed productive relationships with corporations to help them develop in more benign ways.’ (2007: 181)

At play here is a kind of makeover discourse. As an agent of the big Other, this ‘unnamed movement’ acts not only as the custodian of humanity but as a conveyor of ancient and practical wisdom/know-how whose expertise needs to be properly sourced and applied in order to achieve a harmonious reconciliation between our socio-economic and ecological systems. In other words, it is a movement that acts on behalf of the dominant paradigm and seeks critically to reinforce it. This is where the Hegelian form of the liberal-capitalist totality is reached proper: i.e. through an engagement with its own subversion and negativity. A totality is not defined simply in relation to what it excludes as threat-negativity but rather through symbolizing, and making sense of, this very division within itself - it succeeds through the constitutive recognition of its failures and through providing a certain grammar for its transformation. Put differently, a totality is at its strongest when it is able to circumscribe the very terms of its own subversion. It becomes an anonymous horizon that defines the possible and the necessary.

What Hawken and the eco-capitalists are aware of, and what Hardt and Negri appear to overlook, is the extent to which concrete struggles (like Earth First, Greenpeace and so on) can indeed contribute to the reproduction of capitalism as a totality – they can provide it with a dynamic quality. Negri draws a false distinction between particular struggles and event. It is perfectly possible to support particular struggles in the name of a more radical evental movement – for a more incisive intervention against the socio-economic structures. A number of subtle shifts of ground need to take place before a seismic movement can take place. But we need to be aware of our objectives and we need to make clear choices. It is one thing to be Green in terms of recycling/riding a bike and so on, but quite another to develop anti-capitalist ecological struggle. We have an ethical and political duty to make these kinds of choices


So paradoxically, the issue is not so much closure (the postmarxist view) but how ideology maintains a certain non-closure; how it regulates a vital distance with the Thing of closure (see also Daly, 1999: 234); how it inscribes non-closure within itself. Ideology sustains in critical tension precisely this gap and is rooted in a kind of libidinal clause of non-realisability – the drive in service of itself. Thus it is not so much the ‘grip of ideology’, as Glynos (2001) puts it, but rather the ideologisation of grip. The ideological subject derives a perverse satisfaction from being in the very grip of something that cannot, or should not, be approached too closely. As with courtly love, it is something that must remain de-reified and beyond tangible reach in order to maintain its libidinal spell. This is how today’s notion of a New World Order tends to function: i.e. as a Thing of fantasy whose payoff relies upon not being engaged directly. In order to avoid the pain of real transformation (power-sharing, the eradication of poverty, the development of equality and liberty in a meaningful sense etc.), the NWO is something that should not be realised - ‘Of course this is our ultimate (impossible) objective but at present we need to deal with reality…’

It is through such regulated non-closure that the ideological reproduces itself. The distinction between ideology, as extra-discursive closure, and the political, as the moment of openness/contingency, is not clear-cut. While ideology produces and conjures with its own non-closure, the logic of the political is not innocent of its generative conditions and can function to bring about de facto closure. This is one of the problems with contemporary democratic discourse. That is to say, what is overlooked is the way in which the very emphasis on the ‘empty place’, contingency and reactivating the political can become its most insidious ideological aspect. Along the lines of a smoker who boasts that s/he could give up any time they want, democratic ideology is one that reproduces the fantasy that it can submit everything (including global economic activity) to conscious political control and  that we could change if we really wanted to. 

Here we might say that democratic discourse presents us with the ultimate makeover fantasy. Where there is marginalisation there is the possibility of mobilisation (drawing upon the appropriate resources, expertise etc.). Through standard references to widening antagonisms and increasing numbers of social movements, resistance appears as something that is already contained within democracy and its declared potential for infinite adaptability. The failures of democracy are taken as indicators of its success and the themes of lack, undecidability and so on, become part of the mythic appeal of democracy as a kind of systematicity without a system. It feeds off itself precisely in a self-positing way. If there is no credible alternative (‘all the others are worse’, as Churchill put it) then democracy and humanity are seen to comprise a single destiny as parts of a naturalistic state of affairs. In a more pervasive way than any totalitarianism, closure can be achieved through the very culture of democratic openness.  

Laclau and Mouffe’s affirmation of radical democracy also appears problematic from this point of view. Radical democracy is presented as a unique advance in that the dimension of impossibility is elevated to a central constitutive status. Impossibility functions as a kind of regulatory principle in reference to which all politico-hegemonic interventions can only ever be approximate, conditional, incomplete and so on. Political action here appears prematurely constrained, delimited by radical democracy’s very ethos of limitation. What is overlooked in radical democracy is the most radical aspect of impossibility: that is, the impossibility of impossibility (i.e. the impossibility of codifying impossibility in some way). Impossibility is not something that can be encircled or inscribed as a regulatory principle or otherwise. We should rather approach the idea of impossibility as a kind of Kantian sublime (something beyond capture or domestication). The terrifying force of freedom stems from this sublime impossibility; the passage through which marks a radical cut with a previous mode of being. The real acceptance of impossibility is not one of assuming an ironic distancing towards substantial political acts (something which tends to bring radical democracy into close proximity with an end-of-history ideal) but precisely the opposite. The acceptance of real (Real) impossibility flows from engaging the act, from risking the very loss of one’s self and its supporting reality-configuration, in the full knowledge that there are no guarantees.


What’s class got to do with it?

A central problem with radical democracy is that it does not provide a systematic account of today’s symptoms: i.e. of those who are in a position to hold up the mirror to cosmopolitan capitalism. In arguing for equivalences to be established between all disaffected groups within the terms of the democratic imaginary, the propensity exists for radical democracy to become removed from the more basic and constitutive forms of exclusion and to become increasingly entangled in endless cycles of socio-political networking. On that basis political subjectivity would become prone to hyper-activity - endlessly fascinated by its own positions, continually refining itself and so forth - but incapable of acting as such. So the danger exists that radical democracy could devolve into a rather empty proceduralism: regulating the provisional character of all political engagement, repeatedly marking the empty place of the universal, always reinforcing its own prohibition concerning the privileging of one democratic struggle over another and so on. In addition, the reticence over prioritising certain political struggles and identifying concrete objectives – other than a general flourishing of democratic culture, power to the multitude and so on – arguably renders this perspective aloof and somewhat ‘beautiful soul’ in outlook. The radical democratic process of articulating chains of equivalence could become an end-in-itself – a process of enchainment with little real (or Real) political momentum. As in Coleridge’s famous characterisation of Hamlet, there is a problem of continually resolving to do, yet doing nothing but resolve. 

Actual democracy, by contrast, is typically becoming more and more saturated. With increasing levels of apathy and non-voting, there is a real risk that elections will become reduced to the status of an irrelevant sham and, more importantly, that the mythical hold of democracy will start to disintegrate. It is in this context that we can understand the growing authoritarian tendency in democracies, across the globe, to embrace various forms of compulsory voting. On the one hand, this can be seen as a way of attempting to neutralize populist excesses (especially in Latin America where compulsory voting is widespread) by eradicating the distinction between demos (conceived as voters) and the people. On the other hand, it can be seen as something which gives a nightmarish twist to the Rousseauian idea of forcing people to be free: that is to say, compulsory voting (forcing people to participate in political freedom) becomes a way of trying to prevent people from directing their critical energies in more challenging and subversive directions.. As with the myth of market freedom, the contemporary myth of democratic freedom is something which is beginning to require more and more political intervention to sustain it. Today’s political weapon of collective discipline is not so much the Foucauldian one (on a straightforward reading) of state prohibition/repression but precisely participation. It is (acceptable) participatory critique and subversion that sustains the dynamic life of a totality.

This implicit injunction to participate in an inconsequential manner is inscribed further in today’s ‘ethical’ forms of consumption. Not only should we buy appropriate Green/Fair Trade goods, but increasingly there is the expectation that the act of purchasing should simultaneously involve charity (online donations, supermarket tokens to express your preferred charitable organisation etc.). In this way consumption and ethical participation become symbiotic aspects of today’s collective conscience. 

So how should we approach the question of political subjectivity? Postmarxist thought has provided strong grounds for rejecting the Marxist idea of class: (i) the relative homogeneity of the working class in early capitalism has virtually dissolved; (ii) the political orientation of class cannot be guaranteed in advance (see Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 75-85). Class has little/no analytical content and will not play the role that classical Marxism intended for it. Laclau and Mouffe consequently reject the Marxist view of class because it presents a closed and necessitarian picture of identity that does not reflect the true nature of contingent undecidable identities and their basic materialism. 

Yet to affirm the authenticity of contingent-plural identities against the falsity of class necessity is perhaps already to adopt a certain socio-political gaze and to disavow the nature of capitalism as a power-totality (Žižek in Butler et al, 2000: 319-320; Žižek, 2004: 99-102; Žižek, 2006: 55-56). From a Žižekian perspective, class should not be thought so much as a positive agency (the bearer of a historic mission) but more as a kind of non-position: the outcast, the drudges, the slum-dwellers (Žižek’s ‘living dead’ of capitalism) and all those who do not ‘count’ and/or who cannot (or will not) be ‘named’ or integrated within capitalist logics. So while postmarxism is right to critique the positivistic status of class, what it tends to overlook is a view of class as symptomatically resistant to a modern capitalism striving to realise itself as a necessity. In this sense we might say that class functions as a kind of objectified unconscious: the collective markers of constitutive repression inherent to the reproduction of the global political economy. 

Class struggle should not be thought of as an infrastructural datum to which all politics can be reduced ultimately, but precisely the opposite. Class struggle is the ‘part of no part’ (an indigestible bone in the throat of global capitalism) that manifests the irreducible nature of politics (Žižek, 2008: 295). Class struggle, in this sense, is testimony to the thoroughly political, and non-all, character of the capitalist totality. Far from comprising a positive category, class struggle marks the dimension of the Real and persists as a radical undecidable. It is on this basis that Žižek speculates that at the most extreme edges of class resistance-blockage – the rise of mega-networks of slums – there is real potential for the development of new forms of political subjectivity; subjectivity that will be created ex nihilo as the part of no part.


Antagonisms of the Apocalypse

In the concluding chapter of In Defense Žižek identifies four central antagonisms in which capitalist logics are threatening to implode:
	(i)   Ecological – the radical character of bio-environmental intervention which cannot be circumscribed by any cunning of reason and which brings us face-to-face with the immanent possibilities of our annihilation.
	(ii)  Intellectual property – the commodification of knowledge to such a degree that speculative thought and creativity will be effectively privatised out of existence.
	(iii)  Bio-genetics – the extent to which the science and technology of genetic manipulation is realizing (literally) the de-grounded character of human being.
	(iv) Global apartheid – the rise of new walls of exclusion: detention centres; migrant labour camps; the rapid expansion of slums attached to the emerging megalopolises. In city centres too, there is an increasing emphasis on the policing of high end shopping malls (separating the Mall contents from the discontents) – the burning of Bangkok’s Central World shopping mall by protesters is but one example of this.

And yet should we not add an implicit fifth antagonism of the apocalypse, namely: the drive of capital that mediates the other four? As ‘we’ are drawn into a world of ‘financial literacy’ (as mortgage recipients, pension and trust holders, debtors of every kind, stockholders and so on), is there not a growing realization that virtual capitalism is faithless and makes a fool of every attempt at economic organization (including national and international organization)? In other words, what we are forced increasingly to confront is the traumatic Marxist knowledge of money (value) without trust.

It is in this context that Žižek draws an important distinction between the truth and the reality of capitalism. The reality of capitalism is that it is not a closed system, rather it relies on direct forms of exploitation. By contrast, the truth is that capitalism does not function simply as a way of meeting human needs more and more efficiently, but rather as a system where the self-generating cycle of capital-value (C-M-C) becomes an end in itself (Žižek, 2006: 60). This is its unconscious (disavowed) fantasy which subsists as an organising mechanism for the reproduction of capitalism in lived objective terms. 

The tension between the truth and the reality of global capitalism is especially apparent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of particular relevance is not so much the exported gold, copper, cobalt and diamonds – important as these are – but the rather more obscure metallic ore commonly referred to as coltan. According to some estimates, up to 80% of the world’s coltan comes from Eastern Congo. The elements niobium and tantalum are derived from coltan and these are used in the creation of superalloys for the production of jet engine components, nuclear reactors and even missiles. In addition, tantalum provides a crucial material for the electrolytic capacitors used in the production of the vast majority of cell phones, computers and computing networks, electronic surveillance and digital transfer equipment as well as internet and satellite systems; basically all the hardware of our communications technology. Tantalum can be seen as the raw material of today’s information-driven virtual capitalism, enabling it to realise its truth as a self-reproducing matrix. The reality, however, is that the trade in coltan is rooted in an economy of terror: extreme exploitation and privation, child labour-slavery, systematic rape, beatings, torture and murder up to, and including, genocidal conflicts; an economy that is orchestrated by local warlords and which is tacitly supported by multi-national corporations who buy up the coltan ore. 

The corporations publically declare that they are exercising corporate social responsibility (CSR) by refusing to buy coltan-tantalum that is known to have been illegally mined in the Congo. But as David Barouski points out, what companies such as Sony, Motorola and many others benefit from effectively is plausible deniability (http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1352/1 (​http:​/​​/​towardfreedom.com​/​home​/​content​/​view​/​1352​/​1​)). Not only does the coltan ore change hands many times in being traded, it is sold on to the corporations in the form of processed components thus making it extremely difficult to determine provenance. This amounts to a kind of ethical cleansing in which the tantalum-products are sanctified (or perhaps mystified) and can be bought in ‘good faith’, thereby dissipating the burden of proof and continuing to maintain the image of CSR. Corporate ethics is reduced to ethical distancing: this is not what we stand for, we are not responsible. This is paradigmatic of today’s ethicism: i.e. a privatization of ethics where professionals are paid to agonize on our behalf.

Truth is revealed here in its reflection of drive. Capitalism, for Marx, is essentially a system of drive. That is to say, it is a system in which its central injunction is revealed as one where ‘the law which gives capital no rest and continually whispers in its ear: “Go on!”, “Go on!” (Marx in Tucker, 213). Here, of course, the drive does not pertain to the individual but resides in the movement of capital itself – the continuous recycling of C-M-C. In the terms of Marx, it functions as a real abstraction in being constitutive of the capitalist whole. It inheres in the system and, at the same time, establishes a paradigmatic logic of subjectivity. Drive manifests itself at an unconscious level and may be said to possess the status of an ‘unknown known’ (Žižek reference). That is to say, people know how to behave in order to get on in corporate life – i.e. they have to demonstrate drive repeatedly - even though they may disavow their commitment to it and/or may not have a direct awareness of its mediation. 

This is why it is also problematic to speak of capitalism as something which is now becoming dominated, distorted even, by Asian values. The recent spate of suicides in Foxconn’s Chinese factory (suppliers to Apple) is a case in point. Foxconn have been severely criticized for its exploitative sweatshop practices which put workers under great strain. In response, Foxconn have asked workers to sign an anti-suicide pledge. This pledge not only obliges workers to seek counselling if they are unhappy but also to promise that neither they nor their families will sue the company in the event of (attempted) suicide. This gives a strange Kirkegaardian twist to the idea of loving one’s neighbour as if s/he were dead. In this case, Foxconn can be seen as an organization that exercises ‘love’ towards its workers on the basis not only that they are dead (i.e. as dead complainants) but, more especially, that they stay dead.

But is there anything particularly Asian here? Sweatshop practices are a universal phenomenon in global capitalism. Moreover, if we look at American household corporations like Dow Chemical, Procter & Gamble, Wal-Mart and Walt Disney (to name but a few) we see an arguably crueller approach to dead workers and their families. Since the 1980s, these enterprises have been taking out secret corporate-owned life insurance policies which allow them to claim hundreds of thousands of dollars on the death of employees without their families receiving any payment (the families may not even be aware of these policies). Add to this the enormous tax benefits that go with such policies and the fact that they are used to top up pensions for executive personnel, then there are clearly strong accounting reasons for loving dead workers.

The international popularity of television reality shows such as The Apprentice reflects, at least in part, a fascination with the drive. The contestants typically exercise an ironic distance towards the tasks they have to perform, they strike up friendships and so on, and yet once they are in the boardroom  they invariably adopt a ‘professional’ cutthroat attitude because they know that this is expected of them. Sometimes this attitude is further reinforced by Alan Sugar (the businessman/entrepreneur who ultimately takes on one of the contestants as his apprentice) who warns against ‘playground loyalties’ and so on. This is how ideology tends to function as a routinised part of life. Our personal humanity subsists through an ironic distancing that is regulated in relation to ‘what must be done’ in respect of the corporate gaze of the big Other (in this case, Alan Sugar). The distinction here is inherent to the production and play of ideological subjectivity. 

A quick riposte might be to say that most of us do not behave like Apprentice contestants, or at least not to the same degree. But matters are more complex than may first appear. The form of this subjectivity can operate more subtly, not only in corporate life but in everyday terms. From left academics who use letting companies for managing their properties and collecting rent to artists who employ accountants for overseeing finances and franchises to individuals who engage solicitors for the purposes of civil action, divorce and so on, there is the same process of relying on external agencies to exercise the drive on their behalf. With the ever increasing reliance on financial networks – pension funds, trusts of every kind, banking investments (ISAs etc.) and so on – this aspect of the drive acts increasingly as a kind of centrifuge for today’s subjectivity. And herein lies the ambiguity with contemporary left arguments for increased regulation and social control of money and finance, demands for a basic income, a global pension and so on (e.g. Blackburn, 2007; 2008). On the one hand this can provide a basis for political intervention, but on the other it tends to leave untouched the way in which political intervention itself can be drawn into such a centrifuge and do little more than provide capitalism with a human face. In fact there is remarkable agreement across the left-right spectrum that the only way to save Main Street is first and foremost to secure Wall Street; this is simply the ‘way it is’. In other words, what it tends to overlook is the way in which the economy, as a political construction, already delimits the play of the political and gives it a certain tone within a basic horizon of possibility.

As a real abstraction, the power of the drive can also be seen in the context of the contemporary scandal over performance bonuses that continue to be paid to bankers and financiers despite the current economic crisis. While the usual noises of outrage are being made in the popular media, the only real alternative that has been considered is the deferring of the realisation of such bonuses, not suspension. The implicit injunction here is that ‘we’ must preserve the conditions of financial incentive. To do otherwise would be to risk disturbing the dynamic-drive of capitalism itself. This is a sure sign that we are dealing with the Lacanian dimension of suture – i.e. a point in the symbolic circuit that tries to stabilise the meaning(s) of the latter by being beyond meaning as such; by performing a fantasmatic and tautological function (‘it is what it is’). Thus the solution to the contemporary banking crisis is more investment in banking. 


Communism and Syntheticism
From No Logo to No Alibis

According to the artist-designer Daisy Ginsberg, we now live in an age of synthetica. This is true not only of the virtual world, sensory and emotional manipulation, drug-induced states and so on, but also in a more literal sense. For example, a genome can now be built from synthesized molecules. Thus we are no longer limited to cloning/replication but direct creation where it is becoming increasingly possible to move directly from the idea to the real, from concept to creation. In synthetic biology there is the possibility to conceive and create new forms of bacterium that are capable of synthesising fuel, foodstuffs and vaccines right through to fabric, building materials and the very environment in which we live. This gives a new secular twist to the idea of creationism. Of course, such advances may be used simply to further market opportunities; nothing is guaranteed. Equally, however, such kinds of technology can also expand the sense of the possible and to open questions about the future and the type of world that we wish to live in. 

The principles of syntheticism have been with us for a long time. Writers like Arendt (1990) and Rorty (1989) have pointed out how the revolutions of the eighteenth century (and especially the French revolution) precipitated a new imagination in which it became possible to think of the world less as a simple reflection of God’s will (along with notions of human nature/fate etc.) and more as something that could be (re-)created according to universal principles and ideas. At the same time, there was a corresponding movement in art and aesthetics away from straightforward representation towards a more reflexive understanding of human creativity (i.e. as a process in itself) and a new awareness of the manufactured (historico-cultural) character of our engagement with the world. Something similar can be said about Marx’s political economy. There is nothing natural or God-given about the logic of capital, it is purely a synthetic construction. The drive-cycle of capital is based upon, and persists as, a continuous (structural) attempt to accelerate past, keep ahead of, the inherent conditions of class antagonism.

Yet the Marxist tradition has not always embraced these principles and, at key points, has tended to fall back on its opposite: organicism. This is evidenced, for example, in the various communist vanguardist parties and autocrats who have justified particularistic power/repression on the grounds of objectivist forms of entitlement. It is also evidenced in Marx’s analysis itself which periodically resorted to notions such as the ‘laws of history’. Marxist thought has too often comforted itself with the idea that history is on the side of communism. But, if anything, our age is one that is revealing precisely the opposite: history, in its current form, is on the side of a capitalist end of history – our world is effectively Fukuyamist. 

Along the lines of Žižek’s ‘repeating Lenin’, the possibility exists to begin again with the audacious insights of syntheticism – a term which I use to refer generally to the manufactured nature of our engagement with the world - and to develop these in more radical ways. It is in this context that I would like to suggest some possibilities for revitalizing the communist imagination. Syntheticism constitutively evokes the anxiety of being. Answers to questions such as: ‘what is authentic?’; ‘where does value lay?’; ‘what type of world do we want?’; and so on, cannot be found in nature. Yet, as we know, nature can be faked. This is precisely what ideology does. That is to say, it tries to resolve existential anxiety by synthesizing a particular form of naturalism: human nature, destiny, a special relationship with the supernatural and so on. So perhaps a first task of communism is to affirm the opposite: the ‘naturalization’ of syntheticism. In other words, communism needs to assume the full force of the idea that we are what we choose to make of ourselves and that we must stand by these choices. This is why today, more than ever, our enemy is eco-capitalism which tries to synthesize a new kind of naturalism for capitalist evolution. Eco-capitalism supplements commodity fetishism with an ideological fetishism: ‘of course we know that capitalism is an artificial system and yet it has the potential to connect with the eternal truths of ancient wisdom, the laws of planetary interdependence/harmony…’. 

The universal reach of communisms depends fundamentally not only affirming the synthetic character of capitalism (as a discursive construction etc.) but also on a relentless identification with the symptoms that result from it.. This is a much harder thing to do: to overcome the ideological distancing between ‘ourselves’ (i.e. the West) and the excluded (obscured?) world of poverty, destitution, pogrom-type violence and so on. Communists must be uncompromising in addressing the way in which all of us are implicated in the reproduction of the capitalist system and its symptoms. We must seek to reject today’s ethics of guilt and absolution (mediated by international charities) and address the full consequences of the system in and through which we live.

This involves a thoroughgoing (re-)politicization of ethics. And in this regard, it is clearly opposed to today’s ‘progressive’ tactics of ‘culture jamming’, ethical consumption, anti-corporate resistance and so on, as articulated by Naomi Klein and others (such tactics are, in fact, already a part of the eco-capitalist approach of Hawken et al). It is not a question of ‘no logo’ but rather one of no alibis. We cannot hide behind such terms as globalisation, market imperatives, structural debt and so on, as if they naturalised/justified our failures to act in more decisive ways. If globalization means anything then it surely means that we are globally responsible.

Badiou affirms that communism is the right hypothesis. Capitalism privatizes property and places it in the hands of a privileged social class. Socialism centralizes property and places it in the hands of an equally privileged politico-technocratic class. Only communism seeks to dissolve the structure and the very meaning of property itself. Yet, if communism is the right hypothesis, this does not imply any inevitability. Communism is not the ‘truly human society’ that is simply waiting to be realized. Communism remains a pure speculation, a crazy wager, that seeks to think human differences in terms of an uncompromising, and ‘unnatural’, universal equality. In this sense, it is not simply concerned with saving humanity but remaking humanity along different lines. There are many ways to be human and we should not recoil from the idea that communism presents a different, perhaps challenging, paradigm of being human. Communism is radically intimate in this sense. It cannot be a question of awaiting the emergence of an objectively given revolutionary subject to undertake the task of social emancipation on our behalf. We might say that contemporary communism is something that addresses all of us as ‘avatars’: that is, it exhorts us to call up what is ‘in us more than us’ in the construction of a new humanity. 

This is why communism will always be more than populism. Today, populism typically functions as a politics of adjustment to global capitalism – usually along the lines of ‘our people deserve more/better’ and/or ‘we x need to be strong, to make sacrifices to ensure long-term success’. Moreover, populism always tends to reach a certain positivistic limit in its particularistic conception of ‘the people’. So the point is not to confront traditionalist populisms with more radical forms of populism, but rather to reject the very terms of populist engagement. This is what communism calls us to do. The communist subject is a universal subject in that s/he recognizes no boundaries to the principles of universal social equality, justice and solidarity. 

The idea of a universal subject is bound to elicit the charge of totalitarianism. However, what needs to be borne in mind is that the first allegiance of such a subject should be regarded as a negative one: that is, an allegiance to the universality signified by the excluded. In contrast to the traditional notion of a social contract, we might say that what is required is a kind of social exclusion contract in which an entirely different sense of the polis becomes possible. This type of ‘contract’ (or imagination) would construe our primary obligation as one of standing with those who show the failures of, and hold up the truth to, our existing forms of universality (note about Levinas and ‘obligation to the Other’). Already there are all kinds of informal groups and networks of support – especially in the areas of health, housing, food, information, service exchange, alternative welfare structures and so on – that reflect a universality that is in excess of existing universality and which show precisely the limits and failure of the latter. 

A substantial engagement at this level requires a different kind of state and political culture. Against the predominant liberal model – the state as a facilitator of private interests and as an entity which mitigates against capitalist excesses – what is needed is something along the lines of Gramsci’s ‘integral state’. This would be a state which draws its legitimacy from the pursuit of social justice and collective freedom, and where the people identify with, and recognize themselves as part of, the state (and vice versa). This does not imply any kind of distancing from existing state forms. On the contrary, the struggle will have to take place at this level if it is to be meaningful. The defence of welfare, health, education, opposition to privatization and so on, all have to be undertaken, but it has to be linked with something more ambitious and positive: a common vision of humanity and, even more, the liberation of human potential. It involves the politicization of today’s form of state and its mode of politics. The state must indeed be ‘smashed’ in the sense that it has to be transformed into a sphere of possibility rather than one of mere regulation.

This approach requires individuals, parties and groups to take fundamental risks: to dare to ask the unaskable questions, and to propose ideas and policies which have ‘no place’ in the accepted fora of political representation. Initially it would mean a series of interventions of an ‘improper’ nature: e.g. proposals for higher corporate taxation and for establishing dedicated agencies to expose corporate fraud; the outlawing of tax havens and the seizure of hedge funds; prioritizing reclaimed money for new types of co-operative schools, hospitals, transport systems (etc.); opening up of ‘intellectual property’ in areas of communication, energy, bio-technology and so on, to promote new possibilities for addressing global environmental problems; the enabling of de-centralized and independent forms of energy technology to be universally available; to effectively make sacred the idea of putting people first and to reject any profit-making from human need and suffering. Such measures, no doubt, appear too vague and/or too limited in scope to bring about communism. The point, however, is to create a new space in which the themes of collectivism can grow and diversify.

In becoming a sphere of possibility, the state – and state actors – must also take a lead in confronting the drive of capital and our participation in it. This is perhaps the most speculative, and ambitious, aspect: can we overcome the contemporary externalization of drive (the logics of capital) with an alternative kind of drive? Put in other terms, can we evoke a new kind of drive that is in excess of today’s paradigmatic drive; a drive to reinvent ourselves in the name of common humanity rather than private concerns? This is a drive that aims to identify with today’s symptoms and to bring down the entire (fantasmatic) economy that gives rise to them. This requires a political culture that is able to come to terms with the absolute indifference of drive and with the fact that this indifference is the very condition of human creativity and freedom.

Through his creation, Don Quixote, Cervantes showed that the real delusion is not to chase after hopeless causes but to accept things as they are. The point, therefore, is to choose better ‘delusions’, more ambitious forms of madness. Something similar can be said about today’s world. The systemic problems that are driving us towards catastrophe are of our own making. We are reaching, consequently, a point of critical clarity. In a way that could not be imagined by Rousseau, we are being forced to be free in the most radical sense: that is, as choosers of our own fate or modes of freedom. To put it crudely, the choice is more and more between the existing mode of liberal-egoistic freedom, articulated through the logics of capital and which depends on increasingly authoritarian political measures, and a more collectivist mode of human freedom which would also be authoritarian (disciplined) but which gambles on universal social equality as the better future. The idea of communism, as a terrifying abstraction, is unique in that it does not offer any guarantees or sense of destiny. Instead it asks us to assume this choice between modes of freedom and to act upon it.















Notes
1.  This is to be distinguished from the Levinasian ethics of an infinite responsibility towards a generalized Other. The point is rather to make common cause with precisely those who are the excluded abject and who embody the truth of constitutive systemic failure.
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